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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
v,

EFRAIN ROJOS HARO,

Case No. 19069

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, EFRAIN ROJOS HARO, appeals from the
Judgment and conviction after a jury trial in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding, of
two counts of Aggravated Assault, felonies in the Third
Degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted on January 6, 1983, and
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate
terms of zero to five years to run consecutively.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his convictions of
,,,1,iravated Assault, or in the alternative, a new trial.
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OF FACTS
On the 31st day ,if Auqust,

1982, Mr. Phillip Tatum

heard voices outside his apartment window (T. 6-7).

He

testified that he heard a number of voices, at least half a
dozen (T.

he could not distinguish what

lJ).

language they were speaking nor the individuals speaking
(T.

14, 17).

After a moment or two, he heard an explosion

and went to his window and saw Efrain Haro, his neighbor,
standing over Carlos and Miguel Ibarra holding a pistol and
yelling
ment

(T. 8).

(T. 8) .

He then saw Mr. Haro run towards his apart-

Hhen Tatum came out, he saw Carlos Ibarra on th

ground bleeding.
Mr. Tatum indicated that he knew Mr. Ibarra because
his boy plays with Mr. Ibarra's boy (T. 8, 19).

He further

indicated that he had never had a conversation with either
Carlos or Miguel Ibarra because they do not speak English
(T.

21).

The direct examination of Carlos Ibarra was

conducted through a translator.
Mr. Carlos Ibarra throuah his interpreter said that
on the niaht of August 31, 1982, he was home watching T.V.
when he and his brother Miguel decided to go for a walk
(T.

::08-30).
Miguel and Carlos Ibarras' testimony was very simila

They testified that they

fur a

late at night, and

Haro came out frol'1 his 3['art!'1ent bu1lui'1g, poi'1ted a

gun at the midsection of Carlos Ibarra then down at his leg
and shot.

They further testified that he later pointed the

qun at Miguel and said, "Do you want some too?" in Spanish
37-70).

\r

Defendant's testimony was that another individual
named tlr. Romero had overheard the victims talking about
qett1ng Mr. Haro and led Mr. Haro to believe that they
intended to come over and rob him, thus initiating the shooting.

That witness was unavailable for trial (T. 74-100).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLO\HNG HEARSAY
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT INTO THE RECORD
UNDER THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION
The pertinent rule of evidence applicable at the time

of trial was Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
Evidence of a statement which is made other
than by a witness while testifying at the
hearing offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissible except: ... (4) Contemporaneous
Statements and Statements Admissible on
Ground of Necessity Generally --A statement
(a) which the judge finds was made while the
defendant was perceiving the event or condition which the statement narrates, describes,
or exolains, or (b) which the judge finds
was made while the declarant was under the
stress of a nervous excitement caused by
such perception.
lh1s Court most recently construed the excited
l1l_

I

t

l

t J 1-

lil'

exLcrt1on in State v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162, 163

1g - R) •

In outlining the requirements of the exception
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provided for in Rule 63(4), the Court quoted the Washington
Supreme Court in Johnston v. Ohls, 457 P.2d 194 at 199
(Washington 1969):
The crucial question in all cases is whether
the statement was made while the declarant
was under the influence of the event to the
extent that his statement could not be the
result of fabrication, intervening actions,
or in the exercise of choice or judgment.
In order for such a statement to be under the influence of the exciting event, the statement need not be strictli
contemporaneous.

Wigmore on Evidence notes:

It is to be observed that the statements need
not be strictly contemporaneous with the
exacting cause:
they may be subsequent to
it, provided there has not been time for the
exciting influence to lose its sway and to be
dissipated.
John Wigmore, Evidence in Trial at Common Law, §1750
(6th ed. 1976).
This rationale was relied upon by the court in
Johnston v. Ohls, in stating, "It is not necessary that
the statement in question be made simultaneously with the
event and some fluctuation in the time element is necessarily allowed."

Id. at 199.

See also !1ay v. Wright, 381

P.2d 601 (Washington 1963).
In addition to affirming the fluctuation in time
element of excited utterances, May v. Wright, 381 P.2d 601,
has special significance in the instant case.

The court

in May v. Wright, 381 P.2d 601, noted:
In the normal situation the trial court has
exercised its discretion by either permitting
or rejecting the admission of
on
-4-

the basis of their being excited utterances
(often referred to by the label res gestae);
and on appeal this court has exercised some
deference to the exercise of discretion by
the trial court in applying a flexible
standard.
In the instant case, however, the
comments of the trial court do not indicate
a reliance upon the concept of excited
utterance in ruling upon the question of
admissibility. So consideration and deference to an exercise of discretion by the
trial court are not within the purview of
this case.
Id. 381 P.2d at 603-04.
Subsequently, the court in May v. Wright found admissible
certain excited utterances given to a police officer by the
declarant twenty minutes after the exciting cause.
FAILURE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE WAS ERROR
In the present case the appellant contends that it
was reversible error for the trial court to disallow the
appellant, Mr. Haro, to testify as to the excited statements
of Mr. Romero (T. 92).
The appellant testified that he and his neighbor,
Mr. Romero, had been watching television in the appellant's
apartment (T. 86).

Appellant testified that Carlos Ibarra,

whom the appellant wounded a few hours later, was peering
into the appellant's apartment through the open front door
(T. 90).

Carlos Ibarra signaled to the appellant's friend,

Mr. Romero, that he wanted to speak with him (T. 91).

The

testified that Mr. Romero talked to Carlos Ibarra
for

around five minutes outside of the apartment (T. 92)

Appellant then testified:

-5-

Q:

Then what happened?

A:

Well, my neighbor came back and, you know,
it looks like he was a little bit excited
or something like that. And he just told
me to--

Mr. Reese (prosecutor):
Hearsay.
The Court:
(T.

I object, your Honor.

Sustained

92).

First, appellant contends that the statement given
to him by Mr. Romero comes within the exception provided for
by Rule 63(4) (b).

The testimony by Mr. Haro clearly indicate'

that Mr. Romero was in a

of nervous excitement.

The

statements of Mr. Romero which the defendant tried to convey
were also given irrunediately after Mr. Romero's encounter with
Carlos Ibarra.

The fact that the appellant felt it necessary

to carry a weapon to defend himself after hearing what Mr.
Romero told him (T. 98) corroborates the tense nature of
the encounter between Mr. Romero and Carlos Ibarra.

Further,

the appellant's observation that Mr. Romero was excited is
spontaneous and uncovered and re-enforces the veracity of
the excited state of Mr. Romero.

Given these considerations

appellant contends he should have been allowed to testify
as to the exact nature of Mr. Romero's remarks.
Second, the trial court failed to consider the
offered testimony under the concept of an excited utterance.
Therefore, deference to the discretion of the trial court
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on this matter cannot be exercised since the trial court
did not consider the matter.
The record is devoid of any indication that the trial
court considered the facts and circumstances surrounding the
offered testimony and then made a decision as to the reliability of the statement under the strictures of the standard
given in State v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162.

Appellant contends

that as a matter of statutory and case law, he was entitled
to such a determination.
As a result of not considering the hearsay under the
excited utterance exception, appellant contends his case
was substantially prejudiced.

Appellant was left without

a basis on the record to support his testimony that he was
afraid of being robbed or assaulted by Carlos Ibarra.

The

hearsay testimony goes to the heart of appellant's testimony
that he reasonably acted in self defense.

The record shows

substantial evidence to allow the hearsay into the record
under the excited utterance exception, but the court failed
to make any such determination.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE CONVICTION
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient
lo support the verdicts and that the case should be dismissed.
The authority of a reviewing court to reverse a verdict on
insufficiency of the evidence is well settled.
-7-

The standard

of review was stated in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah
1983) where it was stated:
[W]e reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted.
Id. at 444.
See also State v. Linden, 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983).
Specifically, the appellant contends the evidence was not
sufficient to support a verdict of guilty under the terms
of §76-5-103 Utah Code Ann.

(1953 as

Aggravated assault--(1)
A person commits
aggravated assault if he commits assault as
defined in section 76-5-102 and:
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily
injury to another; or
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or
force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.
First, the evidence clearly indicates that the appell
Mr. Haro, did not intentionally shoot Carlos Ibarra.

While

walking outside, the appellant testified that Carlos Ibarra
and his brother, Miguel Ibarra, came up behind him (T. 100).
Miguel Ibarra, according to the appellant, was carrying a
pipe about two feet long (T. 108).

Appellant, reacted to

the confrontation, the pipe, and the threat he perceived,
by shooting once at the ground (T. 100).

Appellant's

specific testimony during direct and cross examination shows
that he did not intend to wound Carlos Ibarra (T. 100, 111).
-8-

Testimony of Carlos and Miguel Ibarra fails to indicate that
they perceived the appellant's action as deliberate.

The

lack of any indication of deliberate and intentional action
on the part of the appellant in the testimony of Carlos and
Miguel Ibarra corroborates the appellant's testimony that
he was just trying to stop them from approaching him (T. 111).
Second, no evidence was introduced to indicate that
the use of force by the appellant was likely to produce death
or serious bodily injury.

The treating physician and para-

medics did not testify nor did any medical expert establish
the extent and nature of the wound.

The police officer who

testified at the trial stated he did not treat the wound
(T. 73).

The state failed to establish any medical evidence

that the act in question was life threatening.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the verdict demonstrates that the evidence does not support
the verdict.

The state did not produce any evidence of

intent to assault.

The testimony of Carlos and Miguel Ibarra

shows that the appellant did not confront them.

Exactly how

the confrontation occurred is not clear from their testimony.
Appellant's testimony shows that he was surprised by the
confrontation and given that he was concerned for his safety,
his reaction was instinctive.

The wound in the leg corro-

borates the appellant's intent to shoot at the ground.
The totality of the evidence "must cover the gap
belween the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt."
-9-

Petree at 444-45.

The total lack of any medical testimony

introduced by the state and the aspects of the testimony of
Carlos and Miguel Ibarra which corroborate the appellant's
testimony show that the gap between innocence and guilt
was not covered.
CONCLliSION
The trial court erred in not considering the offered
testimony of the appellant under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

As a result, the case of the

appellant was substantially prejudiced since he could not
testify as to why he was afraid for his life.

The evidence

clearly was so questionable that it cannot support a conclusion of intent to cause serious bodily injury and force likel\
to produce death or serious bodily injury.

Under the standarc

adopted by this Court, the convictions should be reversed
because reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that appellant committed the crimes for which he stands
convicted.

Respectfully submitted this

;/('.'.

day of

October, 1984.

WILLI,'\.M ALBRIGHT
Attorney for Appellant
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DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah, this

day of
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I

1984.

